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HI. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
There was no actual or implied conclusion of law determining that Mr. Anderton 
was "underemployment," for purposes of imputing income for a child support award, as 
required by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.5. Nor were there factual findings entered which 
would support a conclusion of "underemployment." 
In the alternative, even if a conclusion were made that Mr. Anderton was 
underemployed, insufficient findings were entered regarding the "amount" to impute, as 
required by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.5(7)(a). Specifically, no findings were entered 
regarding "occupation qualifications," "prevailing earnings for persons of similar 
backgrounds in the community," or "median earning[s] for persons in the same 
occupation." Id. 
In the alternative, no findings were entered regarding Mr. Andenon's "necessary 
expenses" related to his firewood-cutting business. Thus, such income could not be 
included as "self-employment" earnings under UTAH CODE ANN. §78-45-7.5(4)(a) 
(2006). 
Mr. Anderton submitted ample evidence of his income and expenses. Moreover, 
Ms. Anderton's evidence and testimony only supported, at best, a finding that Mr. 
Anderton's gross income from his fire wood cutting business was $10,000 per year. A 
finding that such income was $30,000 per year simply was not supported by the evidence, 
or by adequate findings. 
The necessary factual findings for an award of alimony, addressing the recipient 
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spouse's need, the payor spouse's ability to pay, and the recipient spouse's ability to meet 
her own expenses, were not entered. The resulting award of alimony constituted an abuse 
of discretion. 
The ruling regarding the value of the parties' home was based upon inadmissable 
evidence from a realtor, received over objection from Mr. Anderton. Additionally, the 
ruling was based, at least in part, upon a mathematical error, which should be considered 
and corrected, 
IV, ARGUMENT 
A. Tacit Finding of Underemployment 
Ms. Anderton alleges1 that the following statement constitutes a "tacit finding" of 
underemployment, justifying the imputation of income from Mr. Anderton's second job 
for purposes of child support and alimony: 
I'm also a little bit confused about why with this oil economy the way it is and the 
company he works for doesn't have more work and I think he could be working 
more hours if he looked around but I don't now [sic]. But, even taking his gross 
income now on his, on his oil field business at $35,000 a year I think that I could 
easily find that he is making in addition of $30,000 a year out of that wood 
business or could be, or could be. I think his capability is in that range. 
(Rec. 202:1-10, Add. to Appellant Brief Ex. 8.) 
However, under the applicable statute and case law, discussed at length in 
1
 Brief of Appellee, p. 8. 
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Appellant's brief2, a determination of underemployment is a "conclusion of law"3, which 
must be specifically made, as a "threshold requirement" for imputing income4. 
Additionally, conclusions of law must be supported by specific, detailed factual 
findings.5. 
The above language does not constitute a conclusion of underemployment, nor 
does it constitute findings of fact supporting such a conclusion. In fact, it appears from 
the wording that the judge specifically determined he "did not know" if there was a 
possible issue of underemployment. 
Such a conclusion was appropriate, as there was no evidence in the record 
regarding the present status of the oil economy, no evidence regarding how many hours 
Mr. Anderton was working at his oil field job, and no evidence that additional hours 
could be worked by Mr. Anderton. 
Following its discussion of such possible, but reestablished issues, the Court 
found, "[b]ut, even taking his gross income now on his, on his oil field business at 
$35,000 a year I think that I could easily find that he is making in addition of $30,000 
a year out of that wood business or could be, or could be. I think his capability is in 
2See Appellants Brief, pp. 26-30, citing UTAH CODE ANN. §78-45-7.5 (2006), Hall 
v. Hall 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), and other applicable case law. 
3Hall, 858 P.2d at 1025 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), Add. to Appellant Brief Ex. 5 
("'[F]inding' on the ultimate issue of voluntary underemployment is in reality more like a 
legal conclusion "). 
4Hall, 858 P.2d at IQ1S, Add. to Appellant Brief Ex. 5. 
5Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 423 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
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that range.55 (Rec. 202:7-10,^4^. to Appellant Brief, Ex. 8.) 
This does not constitute a conclusion that Mr. Anderton was underemployed, but 
rather, a conclusion that he was capable of, or should be, earning at least $30,000 from 
the wood business. However, there were no specific, detailed, factual findings supporting 
this conclusion, and no discussion of how it was reached. 
In fact, only one of the factors required by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.5(7)(a) 
(2006) - work history - was even arguably addressed. Section § 78-45-7.5(7)(a) states:. 
If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment 
potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation 
qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the 
community, or the median earning for persons in the same occupation in the same 
geographical area as found in the statistics maintained by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. 
No testimony or evidence was received regarding occupational qualifications or 
prevailing earnings in the logging field or the fire wood cutting business. No median 
earnings for either of these professions were discussed. In regards to Mr. Anderton's 
work history, only 2005 was discussed. Moreover, an income of $30,000 for 2005 simply 
was not supported by the evidence. 
An alternative basis for determining income from self-employment is set forth in 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-45-7.5(4)(a) (2006), which states: 
Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall be calculated 
by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employment or business 
operation from gross receipts.... 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.5(4)(a) (2006), contained in Add. to Appellant Brief 
Ex.4: 
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In this case, no findings were entered regarding Mr. Anderton5s "necessary 
expenses" related to his firewood-cutting business. Undisputed testimony was introduced 
indicating that one-fourth of the gross income from the business was set aside for 
expenses. (Rec. 160:24-161:2, 169:13-21). Testimony was developed regarding the 
nature of such expenses. Tax returns were introduced reflecting such expenses. (Add. to 
Appellant Brief\ Ex. 13, 14). However, no findings were entered regarding this issue. 
B, Evidence of Income 
Ms. Anderton claims6 that the only information Mr. Anderton submitted regardiug. 
his income and expenses was a partial financial declaration, thus he should not be allowed 
to complain about the Court's determination regarding his income and expenses. 
However, Mr. Anderton introduced the parties' joint 20047 and 20058 tax returns, 
reflecting income and expenses from his W-2 job, and income and expenses from his 
logging business. Mr. Anderton introduced a written statement of his expenses9, which 
was not challenged by Ms. Anderton through testimony or argument of counsel. Further, 
Mr. Anderton testified regarding all such evidence. 
Ms. Anderton sought to prove that Mr. Anderton's income from his firewood 
^Appellee Brief, p. 9. 
nSee Defendant's Trial Exhibit #13, 2004 Tax Return, contained in,4dd. to 
Appellant Brief, Ex. 13. 
%See Defendant's Trial Exhibit #14, 2005 Tax Return, contained in Add. to 
Appellant Brief Ex. 14. 
9See Defendant's Trial Exhibit #15, Add. to Appellant Brief Ex. 20. 
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cutting business exceeded what was evidenced by the joint tax returns, through 
testimony10 and bank statements11. However, her testimony supported only, at most, a 
gross income of $10,000 for Mr. Anderton.12 Further, the bank statements she submitted 
supported only a gross income of $9,511.13 
In summary, Mr. Anderton submitted ample evidence of his income and expenses. 
At most, Ms. Anderton provided evidence indicating that Mr. Anderton's gross income 
from his fire wood cutting business was $10,000. Thus, the Court's finding that such 
income was $30,000 per year simply was not supported by the evidence, or by adequate 
findings. 
'°(Rec. 25:20-31:6, 32:25-36:5, Add. to Appellant Brief\ Ex. 12) 
11
 See Plaintiffs Trial Exhibits 5 and 6, contained in Add. to Appellant Brief\ Ex. 15 
and Ex. 16. 
11
 See Appellant Briefs pages 35, citing Rec. 64:23-24, 65:3-65:5,^4^. to Appellant 
Briefs Ex. 12 (Ms. Anderton testified that she believed the gross income to be $30,000 to 
$40,000 per year); and Rec. 160:24-161:2, 169:13-21,^/ . to Appellant Brief Ex. 12 
(Mr. Anderton testified to expenses being one-fourth of gross income, with the remaining 
three-fourth's split three ways between he and his sons. Such testimony was undisputed 
by Ms. Anderton.) 
^See Appellant Brief pages 35-37, citing Rec. 25:20-31:6, 32:25-36:5, Add. to 
Appellant Brief Ex. 12, Ex. 15, Ex, 16; Rec. 68:4-21, Add. to Appellant Brief Ex. 12, 
Ex.15, Ex. 16; Rec. 158:24-25, 159:20-23, 161:14-16, Add. to Appellant Brief Ex. 12; 
Add. to Appellant Brief Ex 14 and 16. (Mr. Anderton's deposits of $73,416, less tax 
refunds of $5,347, less net W2 earnings of $26,315, less unemployment compensation 
benefits of $3,710 leaves $38,044 in deposits. Divided by four based upon undisputed 
testimony that one-fourth went to expenses, one-fourth to Mr. Anderton, one-fourth to 
Chris, and one-fourth to Adam, yields possible earnings from the firewood-cutting 
business, based upon the deposits, of $9,511). 
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C. Consideration of Alimony 
Ms. Anderton argues14 that the three (3) required alimony factors were addressed, 
as certain information was presented to the Court. However, the fact that evidence was 
submitted regarding relevant factors, does not mean that the required oral or written 
"findings55 were entered regarding those factors. In fact, only one conclusory statement 
was made in the Court's ruling regarding alimony: 
Tm going to award alimony on the basis of the findings that I've talked about 
financially. I think $750.00 a month (Rec. 205:21-24, Add. to Appellant 
Brief, Ex. 17). 
The only findings which had been previously talked about were the statements 
pertaining to an income of $35,000 plus $30,000, discussed at length throughout 
Appellant's brief. No statement was made at any point in the record regarding whether or 
not any expenses claimed by either party were found to be high, low, unnecessary, or 
ordered to be paid by another party. No findings were entered at any point regarding 
which, if any, of Mr. Anderton's business expenses were found to be legitimate or were 
excluded. No findings were entered at any point regarding Mr. Anderton's net income 
from Ms business. No indication was made at any point of what either parity's "net" 
income was, after taxes, for purposes of alimony. No findings were made at any point 
indicating what Mr. Anderton's ability to pay was, or what Ms. Anderton's needs were. 
Contrary to Ms. Anderton's assertions that all factors were considered, the sole 
See Appellee Brief pages 11-12. 
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issue specifically addressed regarding alimony was "gross" income. This was, in and 
of itself, err, as taxes were not identified and deducted to determine the parties' respective 
net incomes for purposes of calculating alimony.16 
In short, the necessary factual "findings regarding need, ability to pay, and the 
parties' respective expenses simply were not entered. As explained by the Utah Court of 
Appeals in Hall, a "trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to enter specific, detailed 
findings supporting its financial determinations." Hall, 858 P.2dat 101%, Add. to 
Appellant Brief, Ex. 5. 
D. Mathematical Error 
The Court's oral ruling clearly reflects a mathematical error in regards to the 
home, as argued by Mr. Anderton in his Appellant Brief, and further evidenced by Ms. 
Anderton's brief. Either the Court erred in adding $120,000 plus $24,000 to reach-
$165,000, as alleged by Mr. Anderton.17 Or, the Court erred in stating that the property 
had increased $24,000, based on the fact Ms. Anderton points out, that the appraiser 
l5See Rec. 201:8-202:10, ^ <W. to Appellant Brief Ex. 8; andRec. 208:1-3, 212:5-7, 
212:10-11, Add. to Appellant Brief, Ex. 17. 
l6See Hanson v. Hanson, 2007 Ut. App. 348 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) (holding that it 
was reversible error for the trial court to understate legitimate deductions for taxes and 
insurance in determining an alimony award. "We cannot agree with Appellee that the 
error is harmless because V e cannot, with any degree of assurance,' determine if the trial 
court would have made the same alimony award had it had Appellant's actual net income 
in mind.") 
17See Appellant Brief pp. 46-47. 
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testified that the increase was 25-30%, which would have been $30,000 - $36,000.18 
Either way, the Court's ruling was based at least in part upon a mathematical error, which 
should be considered and corrected. 
E. Rule 60(b) Motion 
Ms. Anderton asserts19 that Mr. Anderton should have filed a Rule 60(b) motion if 
there were a mathematical error made by the Court in determining the value of the home. 
If this were the sole issue requiring appeal, Mr. Anderton would agree. However, 
the consideration of a "realtor's" appraisal was in error. Further, the award of alimony 
required appeal, regardless of whether or not the mathematical error on the real property 
was resolved. 
It makes no sense for a party to pay attorney's fees to pursue two court actions, nor 
is k in me interest of judicial economy to have two courts considering the same matter, 
when all issues may appropriately be included in one action. 
Moreover, there is no legal requirement that a party file a Rule 60(b) motion prior 
to appealing an issue. 
F. Attorney's Fees 
Attorney's fees should not be granted in this matter, as this appeal has been 
pursued based upon Mr. Anderton's good faith belief that significant portions of the 
ruling below were in error and inequitable. 
l
*See Appellee Brief, p. 13. 
19See Appellee Brief, p. 14. 
-9-
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The determination to impute $30,000 in income to Mr. Anderton for child support 
and alimony purposes was inappropriate. No threshold finding of "voluntary 
underemployment" was made, as required for child support by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
45-7.5(7)(a) (2006). Additionally, the analysis of the "amount" of Mr. Anderton's 
income from self employment for child support purposes did not meet the requirements of 
subsection (4) or (7) of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.5 (2006). 
Even considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the Court's ruling, the 
determination that Mr. Anderton makes $30,000 from this business, in addition to his full-
time earnings, was clearly erroneous. 
Insufficient findings were entered regarding the three factors which must be 
considered in determining alimony itfider-UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (2006), and 
applicable case law - the recipient spouse's need, the payor spouses ability to pay, and 
recipient spouse's ability to assist in meeting her own needs. 
Finally, the Trial Court's determination of the value of the parties' marital home 
should be modified, based upon the improper admission of evidence, over objection, and 
based upon mathematical error. 
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DATED this Z 7 day of November, 2007. 
HUNTSMAN EVANS AND LOFGRAN, PLLC 
DIANA7! HUNTSMAN 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant 
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